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WILSON AND A SECOND TERM

BY THE EDITOR

We favor a single Presidential term, and to that end urge the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution making the President of the United States ineligible for re-election, and we pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle.—From the Democratic platform of 1912.

WHETHER or not, as a matter of policy, not of principle, the service of a citizen as President of the United States should be limited to a single term is neither a new nor, at the moment, a vital question. It was raised and discussed at length in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and the virtual compromise which has since maintained was adopted. The views of Mr. Wilson, formulated before he became President, while interesting and perhaps even important as those of a close student of democratic government, may be regarded as academic and not now calling for consideration. Suffice it to say that his argument, as set forth with notable clearness in his letter to Representative Mitchell Palmer, though to our mind far from convincing, is substantially that which prevailed in the Great Convention and has been upheld by the people for more than a century. His position, therefore, is supported by the power of precedent backed by fairly successful operation. That the question will again confront the Democratic party in June, in view of that organization's declaration in 1912, seems inevitable, but the issue can hardly assume the proportions of one involving the danger of serious dissension.

The real point raised by Mr. Wilson's oddly belated publication concerns, not his theories and beliefs, but his candidacy and his good faith. Is he in honor bound by the Baltimore Declaration to decline a renomination? And if so, to whom is he obligated? To the country? To his party? To Mr. Bryan who drew the resolution and "achieved" his nomination? Or to himself as a professedly scrupulous keeper of political pledges? These are the questions, involving grave considerations, personal as well as political, which demand immediate and conclusive answers.

1. *As to Mr. Bryan.*

President Wilson's appointment of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State—a position for which his unfitness was as obvious at the time as has since been demonstrated—was a virtual admission, either of obligation or of apprehension. Some think it was attributable to a blending of the two emotions indicated, superinduced by the tactful insistence of Colonel Edward Makepeace House, the solitary counsellor and mutual friend. It matters little. The prospective menace was eliminated for a time at least and, in the view of the public, whatever of obligation rested upon a grateful spirit was lifted by handsome recognition. Seldom, if ever, has ruthless betrayal of a friend won more bountiful reward from an innocent recipient of personal advantage than that bestowed by Mr. Wilson upon Mr. Bryan. While none denied its suitability, all conceded its adequateness; not excepting Mr. Bryan himself, who forthwith submerged himself somewhat ostentatiously in the temporarily placid waters of a happy Administration.

We shall not soon forget the surprise and gratification which we ourselves experienced during that joyous period as a consequence of Mr. Bryan's demonstration of the completeness of his immersion. We were aware, as it happened, of his discovery at Baltimore of the Single Term as a fundamental principle of Democracy and of his insistence before the Committee on Resolutions upon its adoption. We knew that the supporters of Mr. Clark readily acquiesced in the proposal for the simple reason that their candidate had on more than one occasion expressed his approval of the suggestion and had declared his willingness to accept the restriction as binding upon the candidate. And we were apprized further that the for-the-moment personal representative of Mr. Wilson, Mr. William F. McCombs, so stoutly,

resisted the adoption of any resolution definitely pledging the nominee to refuse a renomination that Mr. Bryan was forced to accept as a compromise the somewhat ambiguous declaration finally engrafted upon the platform.

Why at that particular time Mr. Bryan was so insistent upon the resuscitation of a proposition thrice rejected by his party has never been divulged. Although duly heralded as a traditional and undying principle, one looks in vain for its promulgation in either 1900 or 1908, when Mr. Bryan was the candidate and the author of the platform; consequently it was not the usual reaffirmation; it was a virtual novelty interjected seemingly for a specific purpose. Some have imagined that Mr. Bryan felt that others, like himself as quoted in recent years, should be satisfied with a single term. Others have suspected that he wished, in the event of his failure to attain his ambition in 1912, to remove the most formidable obstacle to his candidacy in the present year. In any case, he carried his point after a fashion and, in a speech at Harrisburg shortly before he resigned, he indicated unmistakably that the thought remained in his mind, if not as a positive menace to President Wilson's candidacy, at least as something to conjure with in subsequent political trafficking with his former chief.

But to the guileful no less than to the guileless be their just dues! Despite the firm assertion of Mr. Wilson, while a candidate, that the Democratic platform "says what it means and means what it says," others less adept at making and construing perplexing phrases continue to experience difficulty in determining whether this singular concept is in fact a concrete pledge or a mere abstract notion. We doubt not that the President's own impression is quite clear, but for some reason he has not seen fit, contrary to his well-known custom and somewhat to our own embarrassment in attempting a defense of his position, to take the public into his confidence. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, he has never referred to the paragraph, as in fact he did not in his letter to Mr. Palmer, thus still leaving us uncomfortably in the dark as to whether he considers it a part of a "platform" that is "not a programme" or of a programme that is not a platform.

Be that as it should be, Mr. Bryan is on record by word and deed as a frank and unequivocal interpreter of his own (and Mr. McCombs's) mystifying utterance. The quiet

but determined effort on the part of a number of patriotic citizens headed by the Honorable Wayne MacVeagh, who dreaded the possibility of Theodore Roosevelt returning to the White House, crystallized on June 4th, 1912, when the House Committee on the Judiciary authorized its Chairman, the Honorable Henry D. Clayton, to report favorably a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to the following effect:

The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. The term of the office of President shall be six years, and no person who has held the office by election or discharged its powers or duties or acted as President under the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be eligible to hold again the office by election.

The imminence of a National campaign and the press of work upon Congress prevented consideration of the report at the time, but after the election of Mr. Wilson upon a platform pledging the candidate to "the principle" avowed, the proposition was renewed in the Senate and on February 1st, 1913, it was adopted by that body, seventeen anti-Roosevelt Republicans voting affirmatively and only one Democrat, Mr. Shively of Indiana, voting in the negative. The sentiment of the House was overwhelmingly in favor of the resolution, but the Democratic leaders, feeling that their newly elected President was entitled to consultation upon a matter of so much importance and having no late information respecting his attitude, deferred action until his views could be ascertained.

During this interim Mr. Bryan demonstrated his own sincerity beyond the possibility of question. In a communication addressed to the Honorable Robert L. Henry of Texas, he urged that it was only the *principle* they were striving to embody in the Constitution, not an inhibition upon any individual,—which he felt would be unjust. He proposed, therefore, that the resolution be so changed as to leave no question of the re-eligibility of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Taft or Mr. Roosevelt in 1916. He thereby, as all must admit, relieved himself wholly of the charge of self-seeking in his insistence upon the insertion of the plank at Baltimore. Meanwhile the President-elect intervened in the letter to Mr. Mitchell Palmer dated February 13th, which was duly exhibited to Chairman Clayton and other prominent Repre-

sentatives, who promptly bowed to the wish of their new leader and buried the resolution.

Mr. Bryan was informed of the occurrence and raised no objection. Three weeks later he began his so-called service as Secretary of State under President Wilson. By his act, then, no less than by his words addressed to Mr. Henry, he signified his own understanding that the Baltimore declaration did not and should not bar President Wilson from accepting a renomination. The irresistible conclusion is that, as an objector at this late day, Mr. Bryan would have no standing in the court of Public Opinion and that an effort upon his part to discredit Mr. Wilson as the violator of a pledge would serve only to convict himself of stultification and duplicity when, as matters now stand, he fairly deserves the highest credit for an act which has at least the merit of genuineness and perhaps of magnanimity.

2. *As to the Democratic party.*

Although Mr. Wilson can hardly be regarded as what is commonly termed "a strong party man," we are confident that neither he nor Colonel House, especially at this somewhat precarious juncture, would deny a measure of obligation to the Democratic party. But to what, if any, extent does this accountableness apply with respect to the Single Term? Ignoring for a moment the many and variegated Democratic platforms, of which at least in the olden days not a few were constructed chiefly "to get in on," we turn naturally, and conformably to custom, to the dicta of venerated Democratic statesmen. Of these the foremost are the three who, prior to 1913, were held by common assent the greatest of Democratic Presidents—Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Grover Cleveland.

Each of these, we are bound to admit, was a staunch advocate of the Single Term. Jefferson wrote to Francis Hopkinson from Paris in 1789:

Since the thing (re-eligibility) is established, I would wish it not to be altered during the life of our great leader (Washington), whose executive talents are superior to those I believe of any man in the world, and who alone by the authority of his name and the confidence reposed in his perfect integrity is fully qualified to put the new government so under way as to secure it against the efforts of the opposition. But having derived from one error all the good there was in it, I hope we shall correct it the moment we can no longer have the same name at the helm.

Jackson, too, in his first annual message, declared that "it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of four or six years" and reiterated his conviction in far stronger terms in his second message and frequently thereafter, to the end, as he wrote in 1834, that "our liberties would possess an additional safeguard."

Cleveland also declared against a second term with characteristic positiveness immediately after his election in 1884.

And yet both Jefferson and Jackson were renominated and re-elected and Cleveland accepted two subsequent nominations without evoking serious criticism. Not even the personal authority and prestige of these great leaders could suffice to impose the Single Term upon the party as a tenet of its doctrine. Despite their adherence to the policy, therefore, it is Mr. Wilson, not Mr. Bryan, who is in strict accord with the accepted precepts of his party. And if Jefferson, Jackson and Cleveland could be so readily pardoned for failing to suit their actions to their expressed convictions, surely no fault can lie against Mr. Wilson whose course has been both consistent and in line with Democratic tradition.

3. *As to Mr. Wilson.*

Not only is a good name, as the Preacher remarked, "better than precious ointment"; it is, even in these degenerate days, a tangible political asset. Undoubtedly, as has been so often suggested, the candidacy of Mr. Wilson in 1912 profited in no small degree from the split in the Republican party; but chief among the various factors which contributed to his success was his reputation. He appeared before the eyes of the people as one of highly sensitized conscience whose marked aloofness from the sins, if not the temptations, of the world had been attained through a course of rigid moral training. It was this valuable possession which drew to his support thousands of our best citizens who might otherwise have been attracted to the banner borne aloft by Mr. Roosevelt with the approval, since withdrawn, of Miss Jane Addams. As President, too, in consequence of common recognition of his lofty motives, Mr. Wilson has been spared no little criticism which would have been visited relentlessly upon one known as a hardy politician.

But pre-eminence of whatever nature is never wholly free from attendant disadvantages; chief among which in this

instance is the exceptional expectation of a stern or obstinate moralist as contrasted with the modest demand put upon a more tolerant or easy-going person. If Solomon had Mr. Wilson in mind when he defined the "good name" as "rather to be chosen than great riches," we can but believe that he also glimpsed Our Colonel when he added, "—and loving favor rather than gold and silver." The distinction becomes clear and its unfairness manifest when one stops to think that a thing done by Mr. Roosevelt and laughed away as a mere idiosyncrasy might readily be regarded as a grave offense on the part of Mr. Wilson. That, we take it, is the reason why political antagonists of the President are striving so earnestly to make it appear that, in accepting a re-nomination, he would be guilty of a moral dereliction no less reprehensible than that of Mr. Roosevelt, a possible opposing candidate in the coming campaign, when he repudiated his voluntary pledge never to seek a third term. The two cases, of course, are in no wise parallel or alike, as a recital of the circumstances and analysis of the criticisms will clearly show.

Brushing aside as unworthy of consideration the sneers which constitute the usual accompaniment of a general partisan assault upon a President by opposing members of Congress, Mr. Wilson stands accused upon two points: first, that by his silence he tacitly endorsed the Baltimore declaration and so appealed to the voters under a false pretense and, secondly, that after having been safely elected, he surreptitiously smothered the resolution putting that declaration into effect, in the interest of his own personal ambition. With respect to Point No. 1, it should be recalled that, for the first time in history, consideration of the platform was deferred until after the naming of the candidate. This was done at the instance of Mr. Bryan for some actual reason known only to himself but ostensibly to make certain that "the principles avowed should accord with the views of the candidate." As we have already noted, the fact that this specific plank did not harmonize with Mr. Wilson's judgment was brought to the attention of Mr. Bryan and other members of the Committee by his personal representative, Mr. William F. McCombs. If then, the real purpose of the unusual order of procedure was to "make the platform square with the candidate," clearly when the unexpected nomination had been accomplished the obligation to remove

the disparity rested, not upon the candidate, but upon the Committee,—who made no sign.

To the assertion that Mr. Wilson's tacit acquiescence compares unfavorably with the blunt refusal of the Honorable Alton B. Parker to accept his nomination in 1904 unless the Gold Standard was definitely upheld, it suffices to say that the plank to which Mr. Parker objected constituted the overshadowing vital issue of the campaign, while that confronting Mr. Wilson was of so little importance that probably not one-tenth of the delegates who voted for it even knew it was incorporated in the platform. Bearing this fact in mind and considering further that this could have been but one of several minor declarations not wholly to the candidate's liking, it must be evident to any fair mind that peremptory dictatorial action on the part of Mr. Wilson would have been regarded throughout the country as unnecessarily meticulous and unduly presumptuous. Moreover, he could later, as in fact he did in his speech of acceptance, make the fact clear that he did not accept the platform literally in all its parts as a definite "programme." Herein we find no cause for complaint except possibly—and only possibly, at that—from the viewpoint of hypercriticism.

The second accusation—that of Mr. Wilson smothering the resolution in his personal interest—involves questions of fact and propriety. That his letter addressed to Mr. Mitchell Palmer had the effect indicated and was designed to have it there can be no doubt. But to assert that he was "lobbying," inferentially unworthily, in his own behalf is to speak absurdity. He had become the leader of the Democratic party, and the Democratic Congressmen naturally and properly sought an expression of his judgment upon an important proposal, which in effect had not been passed upon by either the party or the country, before taking irrevocable action. It was Mr. Wilson's plain duty to submit both his opinion and the reasons underlying it, and he did so with notable cogency. Refusal to have done so would have constituted either an evasion of responsibility or a species of self-stultification.

He spoke, moreover, exclusively from the standpoint of public policy, as is evidenced by the simple fact that, if the resolution had been passed and the amendment adopted, so far from impairing his own political prospects, it would have left him eligible to re-election for a term of six instead of

four years, thus opening the way for the possible distinction of being the first and only citizen having served as President for ten consecutive years.

Barring the difficulty of reconciling the long delay in publishing the communication with the assertion contained therein to the effect that "I am speaking to redeem my promise that I would say what I really think on every public question and take my chances in the court of Public Opinion," which may perhaps be regarded as an ignorable circumstance, we fail to perceive how so much as a suspicion of Mr. Wilson's good faith can lie in any fair mind as a consequence of the course which he pursued in this matter.

4. *As to the country.*

The primary responsibility of a President, despite many manifestations to the contrary during the past twenty years, is not to himself nor to any other individual, however serviceable, and not to his party, but to the country. This consideration not only transcends but, in the event of conflict of obligations, it overpowers all others combined. Even though Mr. Wilson were convinced that his own fidelity, his debt to Mr. Bryan and his party's declaration committed him to refusal of a renomination, he would not be bound, in the existing condition of National affairs, by such a conclusion. Technically, moreover, he has made no pledge to that effect to the country either directly or inferentially. The Single Term was not an issue in the campaign. It was not referred to, so far as we can recall, in a single speech by a Republican, a Progressive or a Democrat. It was not passed upon by the electors. The people declared their preference for Mr. Wilson over Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt upon grounds which were wholly foreign and bore no relation to it.

Clearly, then, the broader consideration with respect to the President's duty to his country must prevail. And as to that there can be no question. Mr. Wilson has dominated the Democratic party so completely that, in so far as the coming campaign is concerned, it is a Wilson party; its legislative no less than its executive acts are his, initiated by him, established by him; barring a few hapless diplomats, its office-holders are "Wilson men"; its policies, domestic and foreign, upon which the country will render judgment in November, are his policies. Nobody else does or could personify all of them—neither Mr. Bryan nor Speaker Clark nor Mr. Underwood. Mr. Wilson stands alone—a unique embodi-

ment for the time of the party of Jefferson and Jackson, and more distinctively so than either of those redoubtable statesmen. So far from impugning his own integrity by accepting a renomination, he would be recreant to his trust and play the craven's part if he should refuse to accept the test at the bar of Public Opinion. And Mr. Wilson need have no fear that a people which held Jefferson, Jackson and Cleveland blameless for ignoring what they did say will hold him to wrongful account for what he did not say.

There is no issue in the Single Term and none can be made by the Republican party, by Mr. Roosevelt, by Mr. Bryan or by anybody else. Regardless of futile attacks, regardless even of his own inclinations, Woodrow Wilson must be the next Democratic candidate for President.

PEACEMAKERS OR LAODICEANS?

THERE is a blessing promised for the Peacemakers. There is also a condemnation pronounced upon the Laodiceans. Perhaps one of these days, when we are tired of counting the numbers of peaceful travellers slain at sea, it may be of curious interest, and even of practical profit, to consider whether we are likelier to win the one or to incur the other.

The natural and commendable impulse at the beginning was, no doubt, toward neutrality and the benevolent offices of the peacemaker. We all remember the President's exhortation to neutrality, not only in deed and word but in thought as well. We recall, too, his characterization of the war, when it had been in progress for several months, as "a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service." Those were fair words. Theoretically they were quite true. Beyond doubt they expressed the desire and the aspiration of every right-minded American. It would have been a gratifying thing to remain entirely untouched by the menace, the horrors and the losses of the war. It would have been a noble thing to retain the confidence, the esteem and the friendship of the belligerents on both sides, so as to be able to do acts of friendship, of kindness, and humanity to them both, and in time to exercise our good offices for a composure of the strife and a restoration of peace on terms congruous with justice and with the welfare of the world.

The vision, however, passed. In its place there came too soon the grim and most unwelcome reality. We have been drawn more and more into the hideous embroilment. Some of its most appalling atrocities have fallen upon us. Losses and bereavements have come to us through it. Problems and perplexities, too, have been thrust upon us. Our relations with more than one of the belligerents have been strained almost to the breaking point. Our opportunities of friendship and disinterested service have been improved toward only two of the minor states. One of them is believed to regard us with profound gratitude—in which she exercises toward us a charity as great as it is unappreciated. By the chief belligerents and by most of Europe we are, if truth must be confessed, regarded with an unpleasant mingling of surprise, regret, distrust, contempt, aversion—with almost every feeling which we should prefer them not to have toward us. Not within the memory of living men has the United States stood so badly before the world as at the present time.

Nor is it clear that we are thus merely suffering without blame the proverbial fate of those who try to please all and end by pleasing none. It is not sure that we have tried to please all. We have more probably tried to avoid displeasing any; which is a very different thing. But in neither could we be considered blameless. To do either was axiomatically impossible, and he who knowingly attempts such an impossibility is not void of blame. But if it were not impossible to do either, it would be undesirable; so undesirable as to be most culpable. For above most wars in our time, if not in all time, this is one which involves great principles of international ethics, in its causes, in its purposes, and in the manner of its conduct. We may not say that one side is altogether right in all things and the other altogether wrong. But we may say with certainty of conviction that on each important issue of the war one side is right and the other is wrong; though it may not be the same side that is right or wrong in every case. A nation cannot agree with both the right and the wrong.

We shall do well to consider whether the error was not in exalting neutrality above principle; in practicing neutrality for its own sake instead of as mere means to an immeasurably higher and nobler end. There is no virtue in neutrality *per se*; while there may be much evil. Your typical neutral

for the sake of neutrality is the Laodicean, sordid and selfish, and neither hot nor cold. Your typical neutral who is neutral for the sake of thus serving a higher aim is he who, like Terence, thinks nothing of unconcern to him which concerns humanity. It would be monstrous to assume that because of our neutrality we were to regard with apathy or unconcern the repudiation of treaties, the violation of national and international rights, and the outraging of the fundamental principles of humanity.

"I hope," said the President a few months ago, "that we shall never forget that we created this nation not to serve ourselves but to serve humanity." But it was not serving humanity to iterate and reiterate words that seem to have been empty for eight long months, when our own non-combatant men, women and children were butchered wholesale, and when international law at sea and on land was flouted and made the jest of "frightfulness." It was not service to mankind for us to reserve our harshest protest to a later date, against some interference with our commercial gains!

That is why all Europe looks askant at America to-day. That is why we have lost caste among peoples struggling for the very life of liberty and democracy. We have been neither cold nor hot; wherefore humanity is moved to spew us out of its mouth.

COMMERCE AFTER THE WAR

THREE things are obvious. One is that our export trade has enormously increased since the beginning of the war. The second is that the increase has been due chiefly to the conditions produced by the war. The third is that the ending of the war will change those conditions and will thus powerfully affect our commerce. Such are the elements of the problem which confront us.

The increase in our export trade in the calendar year 1915 over 1914 was considerably more than a billion dollars, or nearly 75 per cent. That was gigantic, both positively and relatively. Never before had a nation such an increase in a single year, while just the amount of increase alone would have made a very respectable total export trade for almost any country. As our import trade did not increase, but actually declined, the balance of trade was of course enormous-

ly in our favor. In fact, our exports were about double our imports.

Now the simple fact of so great an increase in one year would of itself be abundant proof of the special and temporary nature of its causes. It is quite inconceivable that so great a growth could proceed from ordinary and permanent causes. The same conclusion is suggested further and convincingly by the circumstances of the case. It is obvious that the war must greatly affect trade. It increases the demands of those belligerents which have access to our markets for munitions of war and other goods which their own disturbed condition and other activities prevent them from themselves supplying. It also increases the demands upon us of neutral states which formerly got their supplies from countries which are now belligerent and therefore unable to provide them. Finally this conviction is confirmed by inspection of the figures. In Europe our sales have enormously increased to those belligerents which have retained the use of the high seas and are therefore able to get our goods—France, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom—and to those neutral states which are most closely in touch with the belligerents—Denmark, Greece, Norway and Sweden. Elsewhere there has been little or no increase. To Canada, to Mexico, to Australasia, and to Japan, there has been only a small increase, while to China there has been an actual decrease.

We might clinch the argument by citing the values of various classes of exports. There have been large, in some cases enormous, increases in exports of explosives and other military munitions; of animals, breadstuffs, meats, automobiles, shoes, clothing, harness, and other articles useful for military purposes. On the other hand there have been large, in some cases enormous, decreases in exports of agricultural implements, sewing machines, typewriters, steel rails, lumber, pig iron, tools, and other goods not susceptible of military use. The significance of this is beyond question. The increased demand is a war demand. Our commerce is war commerce. We are selling war supplies; we are selling other goods to countries whose domestic industries have been interfered with by the war; and we are selling to countries in which the war has freed us for the time from effective rivalry.

Now what will be the effect of the ending of the war upon the three classes of increased exports?

Well, in the first place there will be a pretty complete

cessation of the demand for purely military supplies. That will mean a large reduction of our export trade. It will also mean, necessarily, an extensive readjustment of industrial activities in this country. Large establishments which have been created, or greatly expanded, for the production of munitions of war, will find their occupation gone, and will therefore have to go out of existence or else transform their activities into the production of other classes of goods. When, metaphorically, swords are beaten into ploughshares, sword factories will have to be turned into ploughshare factories. Establishments which have been supplying the demands of war will have to begin supplying the demands of peace.

In the second place, European countries now belligerent and therefore comparatively non-industrial, will restore and resume to some extent their own industries, the lack of which we are now supplying, and will therefore cease to purchase from us so great amounts of non-military supplies. How great our loss of trade from this source will be is matter for speculation only at this time.

In the third place, there will be a renewal, to an extent also now undeterminable, of the former competition in various neutral markets, particularly in those of South America, where Great Britain, Germany and France have been our chief rivals.

The second and third of these reductions are the more uncertain in respect to size because of certain qualifications which may prove to be of great importance. Thus, while European nations will resume their own industries as far as possible, we must bear in mind that their efficiency, their productive potency, will be greatly diminished by the losses of the war, while at the same time their needs will be greatly increased by the necessity of repairing the material ravages of the war. They will have fewer workmen and less efficient workmen than before the war, and they will have a great deal more work to do. In some respects, therefore, the demand for American supplies may be maintained, at least for a considerable time. Indeed, they may actually be increased, in some lines of goods.

Again, this same state of affairs may compel European countries to devote all their available efficiency to the supplying of their own needs and the needs of their immediate neighbors, and may thus prevent them from reengaging in

the South American and other foreign trade in which they were formerly our successful rivals.

The lessons are as obvious as the fundamental facts. We must anticipate and be prepared for the radical changes in industry and commerce which the ending of the war will inevitably bring, so as to avoid economic embarrassment from them. It will be well if the vast industrial establishments which are now producing only military supplies and which then will have to abandon that business can be turned readily and without delay to the arts of peace, and particularly to the production of those goods which hitherto we have purchased abroad and for lack of which we are now suffering. To cite a couple of examples: We shall hope to see the United States begin the manufacture of its own supplies of dyes, of which it already produces the raw materials. We shall also hope to see it produce its own supplies of drugs for medicines, and of chemicals for agriculture and the arts; so that never again can a foreign war raise to almost prohibitive prices the medicines of the sick, or handicap our arts and industries by similarly increasing the cost of essential goods which can just as well be made here as elsewhere.

We shall hope, too, to see the United States so adapt itself to the requirements of South American trade, and so ingratiate itself with its customers there, that it will be able to retain the commanding place which through the exigencies of war it is now gaining in those markets. It is significant that our exports to Argentina last year increased by 52 per cent, to Brazil 20 per cent, and to Chile 55 per cent. We shall be disappointed if final returns do not show that these increases have put us easily in the first place in the markets of each of those countries. If so, can we hold that place? Rather, will it not be a reproach to us if we fail to hold that place? Our European rivals got into those markets ahead of us, in the days of our neglect of them, and when at last we woke up to the desirability of supplementing the Monroe Doctrine with commercial relations, we found it impossible to displace them in peaceful competition. But now they have been ousted by their own war and we have got in. It remains for us to show that we can hold the markets against them, as successfully as they held them against us.

These post-bellum problems may seem to some to be remote. Two years ago a European war seemed immeasurably more remote. Yet the war came, and found most nations

unprepared. That the war will end is of course certain, and it may end as suddenly and as unexpectedly as it began. It would be a reproach to us if we permitted its ending to surprise us and to find us as unprepared, industrially, as its beginning found most of the world unprepared in military matters. For while we did not know that the war would ever begin, we do know that it will end. Preparedness is the wise order of the day. But there is an industrial preparedness as well as a military preparedness, and while we are cultivating the one, as we greatly need to do, it would be deplorable for us to neglect the other, of which we have no less need. We believe in the prudence and the wisdom of the injunction that in time of peace we should prepare for war. It is no less wise that in time of war we prepare for peace.

GREECE AND THE POWERS

KING CONSTANTINE is his own best spokesman. The neutral course of Greece in the War of the Nations has been variously commented upon, pro and contra. It has been defended against criticism by the Greek statesmen who have guided it, and by men in other countries who approved it because it comported with their interests. But by far the most lucid explanation of it, and the most convincing vindication of it, so far as it is to be vindicated, came from the lips of the King of the Hellenes himself, in his very frank talk with a press correspondent.

The present predicament—for such it must be called—of Greece in her relation to the warring Powers constitutes, however, one of the strangest ironies of history, a review of which inevitably arouses sympathy with the Allied Powers in their thought that the Hellenic Kingdom should array itself outright upon their side. We scarcely need the reminder that after the raids and conquests of Macedonians, Romans, Serbs, Bulgars, Crusaders and Venetians, it was the Turks who finally crushed Greece into poverty and barbarism, so that the very name was lost. That, then, is the first count in the story, that Turkey was the despoiler and oppressor of Greece. The second is that the first impulse for the political regeneration of Greece was given by Russia. That was in the latter half of the eighteenth century, when Russian emissaries incited the Greeks to plan rebellion against their oppressors; when a Russian expedition—not

official but not officially disowned—invaded Greece and strove to lead a general uprising for independence; and when, finally, Russia went to war with Turkey, defeated her, and in the ensuing treaty constituted herself the protector of the Greek Church in the Turkish Empire, and thus made it possible for Greek merchants to sail under the Russian flag. It was then, in 1774, that the Greek national movement really arose.

The third count, a complex one, came in 1820-21. The Congress of Troppau met, under the dominance of that "Holy" Alliance of Metternich's against which we had presently to issue the Monroe Doctrine. The Greeks made an appeal to it for aid and sympathy. Under Austrian dictation this was refused, and Prussia said "Ditto" to Austria. Here then were the present great Teutonic Powers turning a deaf ear to the Greek prayer for rescue from Turkish tyranny. But worse than that soon followed.

In 1821 the Greek Revolution began. Turkey strove to crush it with ruthless cruelty. The Greek Patriarch at Constantinople was officially murdered at the door of his own cathedral and his body treated as carrion. Several other Greek prelates shared his fate. The entire population of the island of Chios was massacred, and Turkey prepared to mete out a like fate to all Greece; as now, under German patronage, she did to Armenia. What, then, was the attitude of the "Christian" Powers of Europe?

Alexander I of Russia, as the Protector of the Greek Church, purposed intervention, and his Ambassador presented to the Turkish Government a strong protest against the savagery that was being practised. His note was in fact a scathing indictment of Turkey for unspeakable infamies; comparable with those of Timur Leng—and Wilhelm II. But Russia did not wish to intervene single handed. It was desirable, she thought, that several of the great Powers should unite, partly in order to make the intervention more irresistible, and partly to avoid the appearance of designs of selfish aggrandizement on the part of any one of them. At that time Austria was the foremost of the Continental Powers, and application was accordingly made to her, at least for her good will and approval, if not for her actual aid. What was the Austrian reply, to which Prussia continued to say "Ditto"?

The Austrian reply was threefold. First, Metternich

wrote, with a cynical and callous wickedness for which we shall look far to find a parallel, that "for three or four hundred thousand people to be hanged, impaled or otherwise butchered was nothing to him!" Even Timur Leng had been satisfied with a tower of only eighty thousand human skulls! Afterward he hoped that the Greek question would be solved by the simple expedient of killing off the entire Greek nation. Next, he wrote to the Sultan, or the Sublime Porte, urging and encouraging an accession of ruthless severity in the suppression of the Greek Revolution. Finally, he persuaded the visionary and fanatical Czar that the Greek Revolution was in fact only part of a widespread and wicked conspiracy against all sovereigns, which it was the duty of all members of the Holy Alliance to suppress. In that way he actually succeeded in getting Russia to withdraw all aid and sympathy from Greece; until after the death of the deluded Alexander I in December, 1825, and the accession of his brother Nicholas, who was not so easily duped by the Austrian trickster and tyrant. So Greece was left to work out her own salvation.

Meantime, what of the other Powers? Byron and Caning in England were foremost in pleading the cause of Greece before the world, and in giving her actual aid; the former at the cost of his fortune and his life. In France, too, Thiers, Cousin, Hugo, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Béranger, de Broglie and their compeers and many others were ardent and effective advocates of the Greek cause. From both those countries money and arms were freely sent to aid the revolutionists; even long before there was organized and official intervention in their behalf. So it came that in 1825 the representatives of the Greek people formally placed their "liberty, independence and political existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain."

Austria, too, intervened, but as an ally of the Turks. In 1825 the Turks were besieging Missolonghi, the chief stronghold of the revolutionists. Some of the chief operations were on the water, between the Greek and Turkish fleets. But many of the Turkish vessels flew the Austrian flag; and when at last the Greek commander, Sakhtouri, won a victory which was almost a modern Salamis, among the vessels which he captured were five Austrian transports, laden with 1,300 barrels of gunpowder. It is an interesting coincidence that now, just ninety years later, the Teutonic Powers should

again be rushing arms and ammunition from Central Europe down to aid the Turks in a war against Christian peoples.

The curtain rose on the last act of the drama late in 1826, when Nicholas I of Russia, freed from the Austrian obsession which had controlled his brother, determined upon effective intervention. He announced this to the Teutonic Powers. The answer came from Metternich for Austria, and from Bernstorff—there was a Bernstorff then—for Prussia, to the effect that they would not join Russia in any such act, and that if she persisted in it they would hold themselves free to pursue an independent policy. This was meant as a veiled threat to Russia, that Austria and Prussia would ally themselves with Turkey against the former Power. At the same time Metternich wrote to the Turkish Government, encouraging it to hold out resolutely against Russia, and suggesting the reply which it should make to Russia's demands.

But Nicholas was not to be deterred by the Teutonic menace, when he knew that the two great Powers of Western Europe were ready to assist him. So in July, 1827, Russia, France and England entered into an alliance; just as they are allied to-day. The treaty was made in London, and it bound the three signatory Powers to intervene for the ending of the war in Greece, by mediation if possible, and if not, by force. Of course, the only ending which they would accept would be one granting independence to Greece. Mediation failed, and so recourse was had to force. A French army of 14,000 men under General Maison was sent to Greece for a land campaign, and many British officers aided the Greek troops. Finally in October of that year came the decisive naval battle of Navarino, which destroyed the Turkish Power at sea. On the Greek side were the allied fleets of England, France and Russia. On the other side were the fleets of Turkey and Egypt, with Austrian ships close at hand with supplies of ammunition for them. Practically it was a battle of England, France and Russia against the Turks and Teutons. The Austrian Emperor denounced it as an act of assassination.

The work of Greek redemption was completed during the following year by the Russian land campaign against Turkey. Already a former Russian Minister had been chosen President of the Greek Republic. After independence had been completely established, another treaty was made at London by the same three Powers, Great Britain, France

and Russia, by which Greece was placed under their protection and its independence was guaranteed by them forever. The first King of the Hellenes was a Bavarian, who proved so unsatisfactory that the Greeks expelled him, and almost unanimously elected an English prince, the eldest brother of Edward VII. in his place. But the three protecting Powers had bound themselves not to place any member of their reigning families on the throne; so, on the nomination of Great Britain, the Danish prince, George, was chosen, the father of the present King Constantine, and was provided with a civil list from the treasuries of the Powers.

This, then, is the present situation: Greece stands between two groups of allied Powers. On the one side are Turkey, Austria and Prussia, her traditional oppressors. On the other side are Russia, France and Great Britain, her liberators and protectors and the founders of her present ruling dynasty. On the one hand her traditional foes, on the other her effective friends. Between the two, her king insists upon maintaining the largest possible degree of neutrality. Yet it is not surprising that a large part of the Greek people find their sympathies going out almost irresistibly toward the Allies to whom Greece owes her independence and her very existence as a nation and a people, and to whom King Constantine owes his crown. Nor is it strange that those Allies have thought that Greece should show her gratitude for their inestimable services to her, by giving them her aid against not only their present enemies but also her own traditional and inveterate foes.

HYMEN'S WIRELESS

THE flowers of Deutschland's culture are perennial, innumerable, and beyond praise; but the most delectable that we have yet culled has been blooming modestly in our midst for we know not how many fragrant months or years, yet we have only just encountered it. Its native soil is Berlin, where, in the sunny spaciousness of Unter den Linden, it has flourished as the *Heirats-Zeitung*, under the affectionate nurture of Herren Fritz Podzeus (most mellifluous of cognomens!) and John Ringlau; but it had an offshoot in these barbarian States, where it thrust its leaves and blossoms through the hospitable soil of upper New York. Let this precious manifestation of sweetness and light be

self-described: It is, we learn, "The advertising medium of the greatest Matrimonial Office in the world. It stands [mark carefully!] "for the promotion of morality and the legitimate introduction of Ladies and Gentlemen who wants (sic) to be married." It is "published irregularly, according to wants. Subscription, one dollar per year, which includes visits to both offices, in New York and Berlin." If you wish attention, enclose sufficient stamps to cover expenses, "as fees for arranging marriages are not sueable." Introductions will be made if the fee of one dollar is paid and satisfactory reference furnished. But note this carefully: "Personal interviews," cautions the Editor, "should be arranged in advance, as I am often absent making introductions." Moreover, do not try to put anything over on this strictly moral institution: "through the exchange of cipher letters there was much swindling and foolery indulged in, therefore I open all cipher letters." As far as is humanly possible, satisfaction is guaranteed—"it may safely be predicted that a suitable helpmate will be found for every applicant," even though "eighteen thousand marriage inquiries are now awaiting attention."

Restricted space, we are told, has made it impossible to project into the hymeneal void, through the throbbing wireless of the *Matrimonial News*, these eighteen thousand appeals; but several hundred are contained in a recent issue, where they may be observed with the discreetly sympathetic interest that their own delicate reticence prescribes.

Even the most amiably disposed cannot but note with regret that, in most of these cases, the mating instinct is modified by practical considerations. Some of these shy souls, it is true, offer rather than demand—as, for example, the "Lady, orphan, 22 years, of a cheerful disposition," whose advertisement heads the first column of the first page of our invaluable contemporary. Being the possessor of "about two million dollars," she desires to marry "a suitable gentleman"; and in like case is the "European Lady," in the same column, who, apparently unaffected by war-time retrenchments, "has two million dollars in her own right," and "wishes to marry a gentleman of perfect form, good character, happy disposition; mechanical engineer preferred." But sentiment and generosity both fly precipitately out of the window as we round the corner of the neighboring column and encounter "Father, a large manu-

facturer," who "wishes to marry his only daughter to a gentleman who has at least \$50,000—but [note the subtle implication of the "but"] a man of respectability." This, alas! is the prevailing note, proclaiming an age commercialized, insensible, spiritually moribund. What shall we say of the lady who is so indifferent to the sweet promptings of Eros that, though she is eighteen, has "a fine form," and \$400 in cash, must marry "a rich man"—"otherwise she will wait two years"? But commercialism is not all on the distaff side: for here is a "Lawyer, Protestant, 26, 5 ft. 10 in., \$10,000 income, a good swimmer," who—content neither with his own exceptional advantages nor with the bright prospects of emotional reward which they would seem to assure—seeks "lady up to 30 with \$100,000." And next to him are a group of equally abandoned mercenaries: first, a "Stump Speaker, 46, 5 ft. 8 in.," who, not satisfied with an income of \$2,000, "seeks lady with \$250,000"; second, an "Iceman, 29, \$5,000 income, \$15,000 in banks" (admirable captain of industry!), who "seeks lady up to 28, religion and nationality immaterial, with \$2,000"—a modest requirement, surely; but, then, an iceman can afford such luxuries of magnanimity; third, a "Poet, Protestant, 52 years of age, 5 ft. 7¾ in., weight 127, \$4,200 cash," wishes to marry "lady with \$5,000"; fourth, a "Count, German, 64, bachelor, 5 ft. 11 in., the real article, speaks four languages," whose consort must be in the \$200,000 class—though she "may be up to 50 years old"; last—and most heinous—a "Prince, 30 years of age, first-class education," who would wed "lady or widow [no widows are ladies in the *Matrimonial News*] with five million." A Machiavellian master of subtlety! We observe, incidentally, that the maturity dead-line varies liberally—from 24 up to 55. Incomparably less disturbing to the idealistic vision than these unabashed materialists is the "Engineer, 27, 5 ft. 7 in., weight 140," in a neighboring column, who "wishes to marry into a machine factory"; and his presumably repentant neighbor, "Bartender, Protestant, 39 years of age," who "wishes to marry into the coffee business."

Reading on, one turns misanthropist. Sentiment, fond illusion, the wand-like touch of Romance—whence have they fled? But let us not be too hasty in diagnosis: here, after column upon column sodden with materialism and avarice—here, at last, is the bright face of Romance: "Miss, school

teacher, 27 years of age, 5 ft. 4 in., weight 130, Protestant, no cash, but to inherit," wishes to marry "a gentleman with brown eyes." And there is an idyllic suggestion in this simple, bucolic confession of "Noble Lady, 34 years of age," who "wishes to marry a farmer." But Romance sorrowfully turns her face to the wall when we arrive at the next column, for here again is the lure of gold: "Lady, mother, 52, daughter, 19, controls at least thirty millions, wishes to marry two gentlemen of sunny disposition, and will go hand-in-hand with them peacefully on life's journey"—a hymeneal four-in-hand to which none but the sour of heart will fail to wish the happiest of trips.

Here we may profitably pause for a moment to consider those matrimonial qualifications which appear to be most frequently favored. "Congeniality" leads, with nine votes; "integrity" and "education" tie for second place, with seven votes each; "enterprise," with six, runs them close; "respectability" wins four votes; "affection," "sobriety," and "geniality" three; "honor," "industry," "intelligence," "refinement," "ambition," "style," "prominence," and "reliability" run neck and neck, with two votes each. Only sentimentalists will deplore the solitary vote cast for pulchritude—one only for "beautiful"! But what will the Eugenists think of the single vote for "healthy"? There are quaint and provocative specifications: one lady desires to wed a "post-office official," another "a head-waiter or publican," another "any respectable man"; and a widow who owns a corset factory longs for "a gentleman who will help her conduct her business." The Nobel Prize for candor should go to the "Spinster, 40 years of age, 5 ft. 4 in., weight 124, very homely," who "seeks husband, widower with one child preferred. Photo and address with Editor"; or perhaps to the "Steady, sober, ambitious, healthy American gentleman," who wishes to meet "lady of medium height, dark complexion, one who works at some gainful occupation"; and who adds, with one eye on the rising cost of living and the other on the reproachful shade of Anthony Comstock, "Please state number of children desired, if any."

And so we come regretfully to the final page of this enthralling publication, hoping wistfully, as we reach the end, that at least two of its contributors may meet and mate: The "active, aggressive, successful young business man of

large affairs, not yet in the full prime of life, very best health, does not use liquor or tobacco, fond of God's great outdoors and the joy of living," who "wants to meet a companion and chum in the form of a beautiful, cultured, refined Christian lady of wealth and breeding"; and the "Widow of a banker, many millions," who "wishes to marry a prominent gentleman with a happy disposition, who would make her life a perfect revelation." But we fear, alas,—as we wish of our wives and sweethearts,—that they may never meet, since we learn from the public prints that last week the editor of the *Matrimonial News* and *Heirats-Zeitung*—Herr Fritz Podzeus—passed away. His malady was of the heart. He died a bachelor.